



CCSBT-EC/0310/14

11. Total Allowable Catch and its Allocation 総漁獲許容量とその配分

Purpose 目的

To provide relevant background information to support the Extended Commission's deliberations on the setting of a total allowable catch (TAC) for 2004 and its distribution among the members.

2004年の総漁獲許容量（TAC）及び加盟国の配分の設定に関する委員会での審議を支援するために関連する背景情報を提示する。

Status of the SBT Stock ミナミマグロ（SBT）資源の状況

The Extended Scientific Committee at SC8 concluded:

第8回科学委員会における拡大科学委員会は以下のように結論づけた。

“Based on an inter-sessional review of fishery indicators and review of additional papers (CCSBT-ESC/0309/26, CCSBT-ESC/0309/34, CCSBT-ESC/0309/44), the ESC endorsed the conclusion of the SAG that there has been no dramatic change in stock status since the 2001 assessment, and that there is therefore no reason to change the advice given at that time.

閉会期間中の漁業指標のレビュー及び追加資料（CCSBT-ESC/0309/26, CCSBT-ESC/0309/34, CCSBT-ESC/0309/44）に基づき、拡大科学委員会は、2001年の評価以降資源状況には劇的な変化はない状況にあり、従って変更する理由はないと言うSAGの結論を支持した。

However, the SAG did note a number of indicators (2000 acoustic survey, 2002 Australian surface fishery CPUE, Japanese longline CPUE for 3 year olds in 2002 and absence of age 4 fish (<115cm) in the Japanese fishery in Apr-Jun 2003) consistent with a marked decline in recruitment in 1999 and 2000. Indications of ongoing low recruitment in the 2001, 2002 and 2003 acoustic surveys, 2003 aerial survey and the 2002 and 2003 surface fishery CPUE will need to be evaluated following analysis of Japanese longline data for 2004 (and possibly 2005) before recent recruitment can be properly assessed. Trends in recent recruitment remain a key uncertainty in provision of advice on stock status.”

しかし、SAGは1999年及び2000年における加入の顕著な減少と一致するいくつかの指標（2000年の音響調査、2002年オーストラリア表層業漁業のCPUE、2002年の3歳魚の日本のはえ縄漁業のCPUE及び2003年4～6月における日本の漁業における4歳魚（115cm未満）の欠如）に留意した。適切に最近の加入が評価される前に、2001、2002年及び2003年の音響調査における継続的な低い加入の指標、2003年の航空調査および2002年、2003年の表層漁業のCPUEは、2004年（おそらく2005年も）における日本のはえ縄漁業のデータの分析の後に評価される必要がある。最近の加入の傾向は、資源状況に対し助言を与える上では不確実性を含んでいる。

Catch Levels

漁獲レベル

Members have reported the following calendar year catches in 2002 and quota year catches in 2001-2002.

加盟国は、以下の 2002 年における暦年漁獲量及び 2001-2002 年における割当量年漁獲量を報告した。

実質的漁獲量 (トン)	
オーストラリア	5,374
日本	6,192
ニュージーランド	450
韓国	746
台湾	<u>1,137</u>
	13,899

割当量年		漁獲量 (トン)
オーストラリア	2001 年 12 月 1 日 ~ 2002 年 11 月 30 日	5,262
日本	2001 年 3 月 1 日 ~ 2002 年 2 月 28 日	6,647
ニュージーランド	2001 年 10 月 1 日 ~ 2002 年 9 月 30 日	452
韓国	2001 年 3 月 1 日 ~ 2002 年 2 月 28 日	846
台湾	2002 年 1 月 1 日 ~ 2002 年 12 月 31 日	1,137

Catch by non-members and research mortality is estimated at 2,213 tonnes, of which Indonesia caught 1,930 tonnes, giving a total estimated global catch of 16,096 tonnes – up 0.6% from 2001.

非加盟国による漁獲量及び調査死亡量は、1,930 トンと推定されるインドネシアの漁獲量を含めて 2,213 トンと推定されており、2001 年から 0.6% 増加の 16,096 トンの推定世界総漁獲量となる。

Total Allowable Catch

総漁獲許容量

At CCSBT1 the Commission set a total allowable catch of 11,750 tonnes for 1994-95 for the three members - Australia, Japan and New Zealand. This continued a total allowable catch agreed initially in 1989 under trilateral arrangements between the three governments.

CCSBT1 において、委員会はオーストラリア、日本及びニュージーランドの 3 加盟国に対し、1994-1995 年に関しては 11,750 トンの総漁獲許容量を設定した。この数字は、この 3 カ国政府間における合意を基に 1989 年最初に合意された総漁獲量許容量を継続したものである。

The total allowable catch of 11,750 tonnes was renewed at CCSBT2 and CCSBT3 for 1995-96 and 1996-97.

11,750 トンの総漁獲許容量は、1995-1996 年及び 1996-1997 年の CCSBT2 及び CCSBT3 で更新された。

Since 1996-97 the Commission has not set a formal total allowable catch for members. The three inaugural members have generally agreed to maintain voluntary catch limits at or around the 1996-97 levels in subsequent years. Korea acceded to the

Convention in 2001 and the Fishing Entity of Taiwan was admitted to the Extended Commission in 2002 with agreed catch limits of 1,140 tonnes each.

1996-1997 年以来、委員会は、加盟国に対する総漁獲許容量を設定していない。最初の 3 ヶ国は、それ以降自主的割当量をおよそ 1996-1997 年のレベルに維持することに一般的には合意している。韓国は、2001 年に条約に加盟し、漁業団体台湾は、2002 年に拡大委員会に加盟した。両国は漁獲割当 1,140 トンに合意している。

Combined, the voluntary catch limits for Australia , Japan and New Zealand plus the agreed catch limits for Korea and the Fishing Entity of Taiwan now total 14,030 tonnes – 3.7% more than the average catch of the five members of the Extended Commission in 1994-95 to 1996-97 when a total allowable catch was being set by the Commission.

オーストラリア、日本及びニュージーランドに関する自主的割当量と合意された韓国及び漁業団体台湾の漁獲割当を合わせると 14,030 トンになる。拡大委員会の 5 加盟国の平均漁獲量は、委員会が 1994-1995 年～1996-1997 年に総漁獲許容量設定した頃より 3.7% 上回っている。

National Allocations

国別割当量

No formal total allowable catch for allocation among members is current. However, if the current arrangements were to be regarded as a proxy, or a starting point, the situation would be as follows:-

加盟国間で配分するための正式な総漁獲許容量は現在受け入れられていない。しかしながら、現在の方法が代用あるいは出発点であるとすれば、状況は以下ようになる。

オーストラリア	5,265 トン
日本	6,065 トン
ニュージーランド	420 トン
韓国	1,140 トン
台湾	<u>1,140 トン</u>
	14,030 トン

At CCSBT1, a mechanism was agreed for adjusting national allocations if total allowable catch were to be increased. A copy of this arrangement is at Attachment A. CCSBT1 において、総漁獲許容量が増加した場合に国別割当量を調整する方法が合意された。この方法の写しは、別紙 A に添付。

An alternative arrangement has been proposed to the Commission in the past by Japan based on the practice in NAFO. This is at Attachment B.

過去日本によって、NAFO に基づく代替案が委員会に提案された。本文は別添 B に掲載。

The Commission considered a mechanism for allocating a national quota to new entrants at CCSBT2. The principles agreed and used in discussions with potential new members is at Attachment C for information.

委員会は、CCSBT2 において新加盟国に国別割当量を配分するための方法を検討した。新規加盟国に関する原則合意及び議論については参考資料として別紙 C として添付。

ICCAT has an agreed mechanism for allocating total allowable catch and this is at Attachment D.

ICCAT では、総漁獲許容量を配分するために合意された方法があり、これは別紙 D に添付。

Arrangements for Adjusting for Overs and Unders.

超過及び未消化漁獲量に関する調整方法

Previously agreed arrangements did not provide any method for compensating for circumstances where quota was not achieved or exceeded in a particular year. However on a number of occasions members have indicated they would reduce catch in a subsequent year to compensate for an above-quota catch in a particular year.

以前合意された方法は、特定の年に割当量を達成しなかった、または超過したといような状況に対し補正するための方法を全く提供しなかった。しかしながら、幾度か加盟国は、特定の年における割当量の超過を補うため翌年の漁獲を削減するということを表明してきた。

Should the Extended Commission set a TAC and national allocations an over-catch and under-catch compensation mechanism would enhance the operational effectiveness of the arrangement. It would recognise the practical difficulties in always managing to a specific figure. A framework for such a system could include; もし拡大委員会が、TAC 及び国別割当量を設定した場合、超過漁獲及び未消化漁獲量の補正方法は漁獲量の調整の手続きをより効果的にするであろう。一方、つねに特定の数値を扱う実践的な困難も伴う。このようなシステムの枠組みは以下を含む。

- a tolerance limit expressed as a percentage of the member's allocation
- a payback or recovery period expressed in years
- a penalty regime to apply above the tolerance limit

- 加盟国の割当量の割合として表明される許容誤差の制限
- 毎年表明される返却または回収期限
- 許容誤差の制限に課せられる罰金体制

The settings for the framework could reflect the structural realities of the fishery. 枠組みのための設定は、漁業の構成内容を反映するであろう。

Examples of such systems from ICCAT and NAFO are shown in Attachment E and Attachment F respectively.

ICCAT 及び NAFO からのそのような方式の例は、それぞれ別紙 E 及び別紙 F に掲載。

Prepared by the Secretariat

事務局作成文書

FUTURE ADJUSTMENTS TO QUOTA ALLOCATION

1. As soon as the global quota is increased, New Zealand will raise its present voluntary catch limit of 420 tonnes to 450 tonnes.
2. As the global quota is increased, Australia will move to equality of national allocations with Japan. At the same time, New Zealand will raise its catch limit to either 1,000 tonnes or 6% of the global quota, whichever is greater.

These adjustments will take place in four steps, upon the condition that at least 90% of the quota allocated to Australia and New Zealand in the year prior to each adjustment being made (excluding any frozen portion) is caught. Should any of the trilateral partners fail to qualify for movement to a subsequent step in any one year, this will not prejudice that country's aspirations to complete the four steps. Catches of Australian or New Zealand quota by vessels operated by nations outside the trilateral group will not count as part of the 90%. If catches by such nations exceed 10% in any one year the implications of these developments will be reviewed.

3. The four steps will be taken as follows:
 - Step 1: New Zealand will raise its catch limit to the equivalent of 4.161 percent of the global quota. After calculating the Japanese and Australian allocations according to the ratio between the two allocations for the previous year, the difference between the Australian and Japanese allocation will be reduced by a quarter; namely an amount of one eighth of the difference will be moved from the Japanese allocation to the Australian allocation.
 - Step 2: New Zealand will raise its catch limit to the equivalent of 4.861 percent of the global quota. After calculating the Japanese and Australian allocation according to the ratio between the two allocations for the previous year, the difference between the Australian and Japanese allocations will be reduced by one third; namely an amount of one sixth of the difference will be moved from the Japanese allocation to the Australian allocation.
 - Step 3: New Zealand will raise its catch limit to the equivalent of 5.469 percent of the global quota. After calculating the Japanese and Australian allocations according to the ratio between the two allocations for the previous year, the difference between the Australian and Japanese

allocations will be reduced by one half; namely an amount of one quarter of the difference will be moved from the Japanese allocation to the Australian allocation.

- Step 4: New Zealand will raise its catch limit to the equivalent of six percent of the global quota, or 1,000 tonnes, whichever is greater. When the New Zealand catch exceeds 1,000 tonnes, then New Zealand will subject itself to a quota in the same way as Australia and Japan. This will in no way diminish New Zealand's determination to adhere to the voluntary catch limits. After calculating the Japanese and Australian allocations according to the ratio between the two allocations for the previous year, the difference between the two will be eliminated; namely an amount of one half of the difference will be moved to the Australian allocation.
4. The first adjustment will occur when the global quota reaches or exceeds 12,750 tonnes and subsequent adjustment steps will only occur when the increase in global quota since the last adjustment is at least 1,000 tonnes. If the increase since the last adjustment is greater than 5,000 tonnes, then a two step adjustment will be made at one time.

Attachment B

26 September 1996

Proposal

A FUTURE QUOTA ALLOCATION MECHANISM FOR PARTIES IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION

1. Preamble
2. Relevant provisions of the Convention
3. Interpretation of the provisions and weighting for each factor
4. Example from other international fishery organisations
5. Guidelines which should be adopted for the future

1. Preamble

Japan stressed as reflected in the report of the CCSBT Second Special meeting held from 29 April to 3 May 1996 that the Commission should establish a new mechanism for future national quota allocation in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. It is recorded that Australia and New Zealand agreed to Japan's request to review the current understanding of future national allocation at the 1996 Annual Meeting. Against this background, this proposal is to suggest the national quota allocation which is considered the most appropriate and fair when considering the interpretation of the provisions of the Convention and the other international organisation's customs.

2. Relevant provisions of the Convention

Article 8.4 of the CCSBT Convention is as follows;

- (a) relevant scientific evidence;
- (b) the need for orderly and sustainable development of southern bluefin tuna fisheries;
- (c) the interests of Parties through whose exclusive economic or fishery zones southern bluefin tuna migrates;
- (d) the interests of Parties whose vessels engaged in fishing for southern bluefin tuna including those which have historically engaged in such fishing and those which have southern bluefin tuna fisheries under development;
- (e) the contribution of each Party to conservation and enhancement of, and scientific research on southern bluefin tuna;
- (f) any other factors which the Commission deems appropriate.

3. Interpretation and weighting of the factors which need to be considered under Article 8.4 of the Convention

- (1) the factors that need to be considered are:

- (a) relevant scientific evidence;

The issues that need to be considered specifically are:

- the flexibility of each Party's fishing industry to achieve MSY.
- assessment of the contribution of each Party's fishing industry in ensuring parental stocks at desirable levels.

- (b) the need for orderly and sustainable development of southern bluefin tuna fisheries;
 - current scale of fishing industry (numbers of fishing vessels, fishers, and the regions depending on this fishery).
 - the social and economic backgrounds which make the sustainable development of fisheries possible.
- (c) the interests of coastal States through whose fishery zones southern bluefin tuna migrates;
 - the existence of spawning area of southern bluefin tuna and juvenile's feeding area at each coastal State.
 - size of fishery zone of the coastal State.
- (d) the interests of Parties whose vessels engaged in SBT fishing (including those which have historically engaged in such fishing and those which have southern bluefin tuna fisheries under development);
 - the historical fishing record needs to be considered and accumulated retrospectively to the earliest year assessed for the stock assessment. (proceeding 1960).
 - the catch caught by the Parties' vessels should be assessed as its own catch record even if they were engaged in joint ventures.
 - the interests of Parties under development (new Party etc.) must not undermine the interests of the current Parties.
- (e) the contribution to conservation, enhancement and scientific research;
 - Conservation
 - the contribution of the current Parties should be considered on an equal basis. The future catch record for the new Party should be adjusted considering the efforts which the current Parties have made to the conservation and management actions.
 - the time the Parties' industries have spent in industry to industry cooperation and their scientific contributions should be assessed.

- Enhancement

- the time the Parties have spent and their scientific contribution should be assessed.

- Research

- priority should be given to the assessment of the Party which has presented catch and effort data used for the scientific stock assessment.
- efforts to assist in identifying the solution of stock assessment uncertainties should be assessed.

(2) Weighting of the factors to be considered.

There is no specific provision in the Convention.

4. Example from other international fishery organisations.

The following is the criteria and weighting scheme for the catch allocation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO) which consists of many Parties and has a stock conservation management record covering a long period.

(1) The criteria for the allocation covers

- (a) Parties interests;
- (b) Historical catch record;
- (c) Parties' degree of dependence on the coastal community;
- (d) Cooperation in monitoring and inspection;
- (e) Cooperation in stock conservation.

(2) Weighting

- Each Party's catch record for the previous 20 years..... 40%
- Each Party's catch record for the previous 5 years..... 40%
- Interests of the coastal States 10%
- New Parties or others 10%

5. The guidelines which should be adopted for future allocations.

		Japan	Aust.	NZ	Total
(a)	Scientific evidence *1	(5%) 1.7% (35.0)	1.5% (30.0)	1.8% (35.0)	5.0% (100.0)
(b)	need for sustainable development *2	(5%) 4.3% (85.0)	0.7% (13.7)	0.0% (1.2)	5.0% (100.0)
(c)	interests of coastal States *3	(20.%) 0.0% (0.0)	18.0% (90.0)	2.0% (10.0)	20.0% (100.0)
(d)	interests of Parties engaged in SBT fishing (historical record) *4	(60%) 46.7% (77.9)	13.2% (22.0)	0.1% (0.1)	60.0% (100.0)
(e)	contribution of conservation, enhancement and research *5	(10%) 5.8% (57.8)	3.1% (30.8)	1.1% (11.4)	10.0% (100.0)
<hr/>					
Total	(100%)	58.5%	36.5%	5.0%	100.0%
		↓	↓	↓	↓
appropriate national quota		6.874MT	4.289MT	587MT	11.750MT

(Note)

		Japan	Aust.	NZ	Total
*1	Scientific evidence	35.0%	30.0%	35.0%	100.0%
*2	Need for sustainable development	85.0%	13.8%	1.2%	100.0%
	• Fishery scale 50%	(80.0%)	(18.0%)	(2.0%)	(100.0%)
	• Social economical background 50%	(90.0%)	(9.5%)	(0.5%)	(100.0%)
*3	Interests of coastal states	0.0%	90.0%	10.0%	100.0%
*4	Historical record (catch record since 1960)	77.9%	22.0%	0.1%	100.0%
*5	Contribution rate of Conservation, Enhancement and Research	57.8%	30.8%	11.1%	100.0%
	• conservation: 33.3%	(33.3%)	(33.3%)	(33.3%)	(100.0%)
	• enhancement: 33.3%	(60.0%)	(40.0%)	(0.0%)	(100.0%)
	• research: 33.3%	(80.0%)	(19.0%)	(1.0%)	(100.0%)

Attachment C

Annex 6

Quota allocation to new entrants to the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna

The following conditions will be applied when considering the quota allocation to new entrants:

1. The quota allocation to new entrants including cooperative Parties will be calculated based on the past catch records of the new entrant prior to the signature of the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna by the present three Parties in 1993. In this regard, figures in 1991 to 1993 should be provided as soon as possible by the entrants and shall be verified between the new entrants and the Parties. Thereafter, those figures should be used.
2. In considering the quota allocation to new entrants, the past catch reductions of the present Parties should be duly taken into account. This reduction rate is 59% (see below for the calculation).
3. In view of 1. and 2. above, it is suggested that in principle the quota allocation to a new entrant should be calculated by multiplying the average catch between 1991 and 1993 by 41% (100 minus 59). The quota may be adjusted, taking into account the provisions stipulated in Article 8, paragraph 4 of the Convention.:
 - (a) relevant scientific evidence
 - (b) the need for orderly and sustainable development of SBT fisheries
 - (c) the interests of Parties through whose exclusive economic or fishery zones SBT migrates
 - (d) the interests of Parties whose vessels engage in fishing for SBT including those which have historically engaged in such fishing and those which have SBT fisheries under development
 - (e) the contribution of each Party to conservation and enhancement of, and scientific research on, SBT
 - (f) any other factors which the Commission deems appropriateSuch adjustment should be made as a result of negotiation between the Parties and the new entrant.

- * The quota restriction was introduced in 1986 for the first time, when the catch amount was 28,841 mt. The catch amount in 1993 was 11,750 mt. Therefore, the catch reduction rate between 1986 and 1993 is calculated:
 $(1 - 11750/28841) * 100 = 59\%$

ICCAT System for Allocating TAC

I Qualifying Criteria

Participants will qualify to receive possible quota allocations within the framework of ICCAT in accordance with the following criteria:

- 1 Be a Contracting or Cooperating Non-Contracting Party, Entity or Fishing Entity.
- 2 Have the ability to apply the conservation and management measures of ICCAT, to collect and to provide accurate data for the relevant resources and, taking into account their respective capacities, to conduct scientific research on those resources.

II Stocks to Which the Criteria Would be Applied

- 3 These criteria should apply to all stocks when allocated by ICCAT.

III Allocation Criteria

A Criteria Relating to Past/Present Fishing Activity of Qualifying Participants

- 4 Historical catches of qualifying participants.
- 5 The interests, fishing patterns and fishing practices of qualifying participants.

B Criteria Relating the Status of the Stock(s) to be Allocated and the Fisheries

- 6 Status of the stock(s) to be allocated in relation to maximum sustainable yield, or in the absence of maximum sustainable yield an agreed biological reference point, and the existing level of fishing effort in the fishery taking into account the contributions to conservation made by qualifying participants necessary to conserve, manage, restore or rebuild fish stocks in accordance with the objective of the Convention.
- 7 The distribution and biological characteristics of the stock(s), including the occurrence of the stock(s) in areas under national jurisdiction and on the high seas.

C Criteria Relating to the Status of the Qualifying Participants

8 The interests of artisanal, subsistence and small-scale coastal fishers.

9 The needs of the coastal fishing communities which are dependent mainly on fishing for the stocks.

10 The needs of the coastal States of the region whose economies are overwhelmingly dependent on the exploitation of living marine resources, including those regulated by ICCAT.

11 The socio-economic contribution+ of the fisheries for stocks regulated by ICCAT to the developing States, especially small island developing States and developing territories(*) from the region.

12 The respective dependence on the stock(s) of the coastal States, and of the other States that fish species regulated by ICCAT.

13 The economic and/or social importance of the fishery for qualifying participants whose fishing vessels have habitually participated in the fishery in the Convention Area.

14 The contribution of the fisheries for the stocks regulated by ICCAT to the national food security/needs, domestic consumption, income resulting from exports, and employment of qualifying participants.

15 The right of qualified participants to engage in fishing on the high seas for the stocks to be allocated.

D Criteria Relating to Compliance/Data Submission/Scientific Research by Qualifying Participants

16 The record of compliance or cooperation by qualifying participants with ICCAT's conservation and management measures, including for large-scale tuna fishing vessels, except for those cases where the compliance sanctions established by relevant ICCAT recommendations have already been applied.

17 The exercise of responsibilities concerning the vessels under the jurisdiction of qualifying participants.

18 The contribution of qualifying participants to conservation and management of the stocks, to the collection and provision of accurate data required by ICCAT and, taking into account their respective capacities, to the conduct of scientific research on the stocks.

IV. Conditions for Applying Allocation Criteria

- 19 The allocation criteria should be applied in a fair and equitable manner with the goal of ensuring opportunities for all qualifying participants.
- 20 The allocation criteria should be applied by the relevant Panels on a stock-by-stock basis.
- 21 The allocation criteria should be applied to all stocks in a gradual manner, over a period of time to be determined by the relevant Panels, in order to address the economic needs of all parties concerned, including the need to minimize economic dislocation.
- 22 The application of the allocation criteria should take into account the contributions to conservation made by qualifying participants necessary to conserve, manage, restore or rebuild fish stocks in accordance with the objective of the Convention.
- 23 The allocation criteria should be applied consistent with international instruments and in a manner that encourages efforts to prevent and eliminate over-fishing and excess fishing capacity and ensures that levels of fishing effort are commensurate with the ICCAT objective of achieving and maintaining MSY.
- 24 The allocation criteria should be applied so as not to legitimize illegal, unregulated and unreported catches and shall promote the prevention, deterrence and elimination of illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, particularly fishing by flag of convenience vessels.
- 25 The allocation criteria should be applied in a manner that encourages cooperating Non-Contracting parties, Entities and Fishing Entities to become Contracting Parties, where they are eligible to do so.
- 26 The allocation criteria should be applied to encourage cooperation between the developing States of the region and other fishing States for the sustainable use of the stocks managed by ICCAT and in accordance with the relevant international instruments.
- 27 No qualifying participant shall trade or sell its quota allocation or a part thereof.

Attachment E

**RECOMMENDATION BY ICCAT
REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH MANAGEMENT MEASURES
WHICH DEFINE QUOTAS AND/OR CATCH LIMITS**

RECOGNIZING that the *Recommendation Regarding Compliance in the Bluefin Tuna and North Atlantic Swordfish Fisheries* was adopted at the 1996 Commission meeting and it was extended to include compliance in the South Atlantic swordfish fishery at the 1997 Commission meeting;

NOTING the treatment of overage and underage differs among the stocks and this complicates quota management and compliance;

RECOGNIZING the need to simplify the rules by generalizing the treatment of overage and underage to avoid future confusion;

**THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF THE CONSERVATION
OF ATLANTIC TUNAS (ICCAT) RECOMMENDS THAT:**

- 1 For any species under quota/catch limit management, underages/overages from one year may be added to/must be subtracted from the quota/catch limit of the management period immediately after or one year after that year, unless any recommendation on a stock specifically deals with overages/underages, in which case that recommendation will take precedence.

Attachment F

B. Chartering Operations

1. Each Contracting Party may utilize partly or wholly quota and shrimp fishing days allocated to that Party under Schedule I and Part I.G by way of charter arrangement with a fishing vessel flying the flag of another Contracting Party notified in accordance with Part III.D, subject to:
 - the consent of the flag Contracting Party;
 - a favourable proposal adopted through a mail vote in accordance with Article XI.2 of the Convention.
2. Contracting Parties shall limit such charter arrangements to one fishing vessel per year and for a limited duration not exceeding 6 months.
3. Contracting Parties intending to have recourse to such charter arrangements shall together with a request for a mail vote notify the following information to the NAFO Executive Secretary:
 - the name and registration of the chartered vessel and the relevant flag Contracting Party
 - a copy of the charter
 - the fishing possibilities concerned
 - the date as from which the vessel is authorized to commence fishing on these fishing possibilities
 - the duration of the charter
4. The relevant flag Contracting Party shall notify in writing its consent to the NAFO Executive Secretary.
5. The NAFO Executive Secretary shall circulate the above information and the consent of the flag Contracting Party without delay to Contracting Parties.
6. The relevant flag Contracting Party is responsible for ensuring that the vessel complies with the requirements of the NAFO Conservation and Enforcement Measures. This does not nullify the obligations of the Contracting Party to which the quota and shrimp fishing days have been allocated under Part I of the Conservation and Enforcement Measures, as appropriate.
7. All catches and incidental catches from such chartering arrangements shall be recorded by the relevant flag Contracting Party separate from other national catch data recorded according to Part I.D., and shall be reported to the Contracting Party to which the fishing possibilities have been allocated and to the Executive Secretary separate from other national catch data according to Part I.D. The Executive Secretary shall add these catches to the catch statistics of the Contracting Party to which the fishing possibilities have originally been allocated.
8. As a pilot project, these provisions shall apply only to the year 2003.

C. Quota Adjustments

1. When information satisfactory to the Executive Secretary indicates that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a quota of a Contracting Party has been taken, he shall immediately inform that Contracting Party. Should that Contracting Party, fail within **15 days** either to cease fishing or to demonstrate that the quota has not been taken, the Executive Secretary shall so report without delay to the Fisheries Commission.
2. (a) When the Commission finds that vessels of a Contracting Party have taken more than the quota allocated to that Contracting Party, the Commission may adjust the corresponding quota for that Contracting Party in a succeeding quota period.

- (b) When the Commission finds that a Contracting Party failed to report an intention to fish under an allocation to "Others" and subsequently took catches thereunder, or failed to report, in accordance with the Commission's measures, catches taken under an allocation to "Others", or continued a directed fishery under an allocation to "Others" after this fishing had been prohibited in accordance with the Commission's measures, the Commission may propose measures to compensate for damage to the stocks caused by the excessive catch. Such measures might include adjustments to quotas or the establishment of new quotas for that Contracting Party as might be appropriate.
3. Where applicable, quota adjustments shall be made during the determination by the Commission of relevant quotas for the following quota period, and shall not result in an increase in any other quota for the Contracting Party to which the quota adjustment applies, nor in any increase in the relevant quota for any other Contracting Party unless the Commission determines that the increase will not cause further harm to the stock.

D. Recording of Catch

- 1. A Contracting Party shall ensure that each vessel of that Party with fish on board shall, on entering the Regulatory Area, have a record in its fishing logbook of the amount of each species of fish on board.
- 2. (a) For fish taken subject to Commission measures, a Contracting Party shall ensure that all vessels of that Party fishing in the Regulatory Area record:
 - (i) their catches on a daily basis. All **logbook entries** listed in **Schedule II** shall be completed in accordance with its instructions and using the codes specified therein, and
 - (ii) the estimated **cumulative catch** on a daily basis in the form prescribed in **Schedule III**.
- (b) The records shall:
 - (i) correspond to the smallest geographical area for which a quota has been allocated,
 - (ii) show the disposition of the catch including any fish off-loaded while the vessel is operating in the Regulatory Area, and
 - (iii) be retained aboard the vessel for the duration of the quota period.
- (c) For all fish taken under paragraph 2 (a), Contracting Parties shall ensure that all vessels of that Party fishing in the Regulatory Area shall either:
 - (i) record their cumulative production by species and product form in a production logbook,
or
 - (ii) stow in the hold all processed catch in such a way that each species is stowed separately. A stowage plan shall be maintained showing the location of the products in the hold.
- 3. (a) A Contracting Party shall, within **30 days** following the calendar month in which the catches were made, **report provisional monthly** catches by species and stock area to the Executive Secretary, whether or not that Party has quota allocations for the stocks from which catches were obtained.
- (b) The Executive Secretary shall, within **10 days** following the monthly deadlines for receipt of the provisional catch statistics, collate the information received and circulate it to Contracting Parties.